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Climate change results from an increased concentration 
of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, 
and methane associated with economic activities, 
including energy, industry, transport, and land use 
patterns. Rich countries emit the majority of these 
gases, while poor countries are more vulnerable to their 
negative effects. Further, developing countries are more 
vulnerable and less able to adapt to these changing 
climatic conditions because of their locations; greater 
dependence on agriculture and natural resources; larger 
variations in weather and temperature conditions; and 
lower availability of critical resources like water, land, 
production inputs, capital, and public services. 
The inability of developing countries to respond and 
act immediately to lessen the impacts of climate change 
will have serious global economic consequences. 
Appropriate climate change policies, if adopted now, can 
stimulate pro-poor investment. More specifically, they 
can increase the profitability of environmentally 
sustainable practices even as they generate income for 
small producers and investment flows for rural 
communities. Climate mitigation through carbon offsets 
and carbon trading can increase income in rural areas in 
developing countries, directly improving livelihoods while 
enhancing adaptive capacity. In its recently released 
fourth assessment report, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change concluded that a portfolio of both 
adaptation and mitigation will be required. This brief 
supports this conclusion as it explores pro-poor 
adaptation, risk management, and mitigation strategies 
in response to climate change. 
Adaptation and Risk Management Strategies 
Emissions of greenhouse gases universally contribute to 
observed and anticipated climate change, but their 
benefits are experienced locally. Anthropogenic climate 
change is thus an exploitation of the global commons 
that requires, almost by definition, policy intervention. 
Yet, given the profound uncertainty that clouds our 
understanding of the climate system and our 
expectations about how future economic activity will 
unfold over time, standard cost–benefit techniques are 
giving way to a risk management perspective within 
which uncertainty is itself a reason to act. Inasmuch as 
even the most stringent restriction of emissions would 
still leave the globe committed to significant risk of 
climate impacts, a mix of adaptation and mitigation is 
required. And given the lack of capacity to adapt to 
climate change in many developing countries—and the 
imperative to do so—the key issue is how national 
governments and the international community can work 
together to assist poor constituencies in adapting to 
observed and anticipated climate-related stresses, even 
as they also work to reduce emissions. This includes the 
type of assistance required and how it can be targeted 
effectively to the poor. Further, many communities, not 
necessarily limited to the poor, are not even well 
adapted to their current climates. It therefore follows 
that any efforts toward adaptation must build on 
present circumstances. 
Adaptation Measures, Policies, and Strategies 
Most of the literature about adaptation focuses on a 
variety of adaptation “measures.” In any given context, 
however, the choice of measures may be constrained by 
factors such as their expense, lack of knowledge on how 
to implement them, and countervailing beliefs and 
cultural practices. Notwithstanding these impediments, 
farmers and others at risk from climate change can be 
provided with external help. Possibilities include the 
provision of technical information, advice, or guidance; 
the provision of weather and seasonal climate forecasts 
and warnings; drought or flood relief; and insurance or 
other forms of financial assistance and risk spreading. 
Decisions about adaptation measures are shaped by 
public policy, which can be supportive or provide barriers 
or disincentives. Issues include how much the 
government and international community is doing to 
create and deploy improved technology and 
management techniques; the effect of public policy on 
crop and livelihood diversification; the agricultural policies 
in place; and how climate variability and change is 
factored into policy choices. Many of the policies that can 
be adopted or strengthened represent existing needs. 
Effective adaptation requires the judicious selection 
of measures within a policy context and within a 
strategic development framework. Market signals are an 
essential factor in determining the necessary responses 
to a changing environment, but they also involve 
potentially significant and expensive time lags, and they 
overlook equity. A risk management perspective 
addresses both these issues, but it is the second that 
provides the measure of success or failure. 
Modes of External Assistance 
Public intervention in implementing adaptation 
measures and policies, encouraged and facilitated by 
the international community, falls into five categories: 
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1.  Providing information and advice. Government 
agencies can provide information and advice about 
climate risk and available adaptation or coping 
strategies. 
2.  Providing guidance and training. Beyond information 
and advice, governments can proactively demonstrate 
how specific adaptation measures can be designed 
and implemented. 
3.  Promoting adaptation measures. A further step is for 
governments to promote desirable adaptation 
outcomes through policy measures, including 
eliminating inappropriate measures, such as electricity 
subsidies in India that promote overuse of electricity 
and overmining of groundwater. 
4.  Mandating adaptation. In certain cases, it is 
appropriate for governments to require adaptation to 
safeguard public health and safety. For example, 
vulnerability to climate change would rise if irrigation 
agriculture were to expand beyond available water 
resources. 
5.  Institutionalizing adaptation capacity and policy. It is 
not unusual for climate change policy to be managed 
and kept within the confines of one ministry or 
department, but some form of interdepartmental 
cooperation is necessary. 
Mainstreaming Adaptation into  
Development Planning 
Economic growth is necessary for poverty reduction and 
promoting adaptation to climate change, but long-term 
growth cannot be sustained without ensuring that 
emerging patterns of agriculture, industry, and trade do 
not unduly impinge on ecological health and resilience. 
The tendency has been to treat adaptation to climate 
change as a stand-alone activity, but it should be 
integrated into development projects, plans, policies, 
and strategies. Development policy issues must inform 
the work of the climate change community such that 
they combine their perspectives in the formulation and 
implementation of integrated approaches and processes 
that recognize how persistent poverty and 
environmental needs exacerbate the adverse 
consequences of climate change. 
Although linkages between climate change 
adaptation and sustainable development should appear 
to be self-evident, it has been difficult to act on them in 
practice. A significant adaptation gap exists in many 
developing countries, particularly those populated by the 
rural poor who subsist on agriculture. While mitigation 
within the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) includes clearly defined 
objectives, measures, costs, and instruments, this is not 
the case for adaptation. Much less attention has been 
paid to making development more resilient to climate 
change impacts and to identify the barriers to 
mainstreaming climate change adaptation within 
development activities. 
Moving Forward 
Clearly the adaptation agenda is broad. Much of the 
action required is at the local level, and its precise 
nature depends on local circumstances. But much can 
be done with international support at the national level 
to support local adaptation initiatives. Three such 
actions are described below: 
1.  National adaptation action plans. All countries should 
have national adaptation plans that take a broad 
strategic view of future development paths and 
expected climate change impacts, and examine and 
adjust policies, including those related to agriculture, 
forests, fisheries, water, and other natural resources, 
as well as health, infrastructure, and ecosystems. The 
policy review could also include the management of 
extreme weather events and areas of particular risk, 
such as exposed coastal zones, steep mountain 
slopes, and so on. Specific adaptation measures could 
then be evaluated and selected within the context of a 
climate-sensitive strategy and set of policies. 
2.  Financing for national adaptation plans. A common 
concern of developing countries is that their 
participation in multilateral environmental agreements 
imposes high costs. It seems realistic to suggest that 
developed countries, acting collectively through the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), support the 
preparation of adaptation plans. This would help not 
only to ensure that climate is adequately considered in 
national development plans and sectoral policies, but 
also to reassure donors and investors that climate 
change adaptation measures are well conceived and 
represent sound expenditures. Plans also need to be 
implemented, requiring further support. Most of the 
present funding for adaptation has been on a 
voluntary basis. Funds are established under GEF, 
developed countries make contributions, and 
developing countries access the funds indirectly 
through one of three implementing agencies (the 
United Nations Development Programme, the United 
Nations Environment Programme, or the World Bank). 
The growth in these funds has been slow, partly 
because donor countries lack sufficient confidence in 
the modalities for the effective use of the funds. 
Creation of national adaptation plans could go a long 
way toward alleviating this problem. Negotiations on 
the preparation of such plans would require time, so if 
such ideas are to be included in post-2012 
agreements, there is no time to lose. 
3.  Climate insurance. A further suggestion concerns the 
provision of insurance against climate risk. Countries, 
communities, and individuals in most developing 
countries have little or no insurance coverage against 
extreme weather events. The private insurance 
industry is poorly developed in many cases, and fear 
of losses in uninsured catastrophic events is a 
significant deterrent. The need and opportunity exists 
to develop public–private partnerships to expand 
insurance against climate-related events in developing 
countries. Such initiatives could serve three purposes: 
first, they could perform the classical insurance 
function of spreading risk; second, they could ensure 
continuity of government operations after a severe 
loss event; and third, and most important in the 
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adequate adaptation measures are taken. Insurance 
in this case would be an instrument of public policy, 
not an end in itself, the objective being to reduce 
vulnerability by encouraging, facilitating, or even 
mandating the adoption of adaptation measures. 
Insurance could be made available at concessionary 
rates, subject to the insured activity or property 
meeting certain adaptation or vulnerability reduction 
requirements. 
Pro-poor Mitigation Strategies 
Since adaptation becomes costlier and less effective as 
the magnitude of climate changes increases, mitigation 
of climate change remains essential. The greater the 
level of mitigation that can be achieved at affordable 
cost, the smaller the burdens placed on adaptation. 
Effective reform of carbon trading and carbon offsets to 
better include farmers and foresters in developing 
countries could have significant benefits in mitigation in 
addition to encouraging environmentally sustainable 
practices and improving rural incomes to enhance 
adaptive capacity. Global carbon trading will increase 
dramatically under present trends, but two key 
constraints need to be overcome before significant 
benefits can be channeled to rural areas in developing 
countries: first, the rules of access—which still do not 
credit developing countries for reducing emissions by 
avoiding deforestation or improving soil carbon 
sequestration—must change; and second, the 
operational rules, with their high transaction costs for 
developing countries and small farmers and foresters in 
particular, must be streamlined. 
The innovative approach of the Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX) to carbon trading suggests that the 
technical reasons for excluding forestry conservation 
and soil carbon sequestration can be overcome and 
transaction costs reduced by simplifying the rules and 
using modern monitoring techniques. The agricultural, 
forestry, and land use systems of developing countries 
can be better developed into the carbon-trading system 
through policy reforms in global governance of carbon 
trading, to sectoral and micro-level design of markets 
and contracts, and institutional development at the 
community level. Streamlining the measurement and 
enforcement of offsets, financial flows, and carbon 
credits for investors is also required. 
Greenhouse Gases, Land Use, and Agriculture 
Land use change (18.2 percent) and agriculture (13.5 
percent) together create nearly one-third of greenhouse 
gas emissions. The share of these kinds of emissions is 
far larger in developing countries and still larger in least 
developed countries. Achieving significant carbon 
mitigation in developing countries will require tapping 
carbon offsets from agriculture and land use change. 
While not as large as the potential for savings from 
reducing the consumption of fossil fuels, the total 
potential savings from various agricultural and land use 
change activities is still substantial and is achievable at a 
competitive cost. With as much as 13 gigatons of carbon 
dioxide per year at prices of US$10–20 per ton, this 
represents potential financial flows of US$130–260 billion 
annually, comparable to annual official development 
assistance of US$100 billion, and foreign direct 
investment in developing countries of US$150 billion. 
Adopting Innovative Pro-Poor Approaches  
for Developing Countries 
In addition to the crucial steps of including soil carbon 
offsets and avoided deforestation in the Convention’s 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a number of 
other changes are needed. To ensure that these 
emerging carbon markets benefit developing countries, 
CDM rules should encourage the participation of small 
farmers and community forest and agroforestry 
producers, and protect them against major livelihood 
risks while still meeting investor needs and rigorously 
ensured carbon offset goals. This can be supported 
through the following mechanisms: 
1.  Broadening the definition of afforestation and 
reforestation. Agroforestry, assisted natural 
regeneration, forest rehabilitation, forest gardens, 
and improved forest fallow projects should all be 
eligible under CDM, because they offer a low-cost 
approach to carbon sequestration while offering 
fewer social risks and significant community and 
biodiversity benefits. Short-duration tree-growing 
activities should be permitted, with suitable 
discounting. Limiting project types would introduce 
forest product market distortions unfairly favoring 
large plantations. 
2.  Promoting measures to reduce transaction costs. 
Rigorous but simplified procedures as typified by 
the CCX should be adapted to developing-country 
carbon offset projects. According to the Marrakesh 
Accords, small-scale projects can benefit from 
simplified ways of determining baselines and 
monitoring carbon emissions. Small-scale 
agroforestry and soil carbon sequestration projects 
should be eligible for simplified modalities to reduce 
the costs of these projects. The permanence 
requirement for carbon sequestration should be 
revised to allow shorter term contracts, or contracts 
that pay based on the amount of carbon saved per 
year, which would avoid the need for “locking up” 
land in forest land uses for prolonged periods. 
3.  Establishing international capacity building and 
advisory services. The successful promotion of 
livelihood enhancing CDM forestry projects will 
require investment in capacity-building and 
advisory services for potential investors, project 
designers and managers, national policymakers, 
and leaders of local organizations and federations. 
Regional centers could be established to assist 
countries and communities involved in forest 
carbon trading. Institutional innovations can 
provide economies of scale and specialization. 
Companies or agencies can provide specialized 
business services for low-income producers to help 
them negotiate deals or design monitoring systems. 
Locally accountable intermediary organizations can 
manage projects and mediate between investors 
and local people.   4 
Finally, further investment in advanced 
measurement and monitoring can dramatically 
reduce transaction costs. Measurement and 
monitoring techniques have been improving rapidly 
thanks to a growing body of field measurements and 
the use of statistics and computer modeling, remote 
sensing, global positioning systems, and geographic 
information systems, so that changes in stocks of 
carbon can now be estimated more accurately at 
lower cost. 
Conclusions 
Policies focused on mitigating the effects of climate 
change, if carefully designed, can create a new 
development strategy that encourages the creation of 
new value in pro-poor investments by increasing 
profitability of environmentally sustainable practices. To 
achieve this goal, it will be necessary to streamline the 
measurement and enforcement of offsets, financial 
flows, and carbon credits for investors. It is important to 
enhance global financial facilities and governance to 
simplify rules and increase funding flows for mitigation 
in developing countries. 
Challenges and opportunities are not quite as clear 
when it comes to adaptation, however. There is no 
single definition of what it means to adapt to a stress, 
and there are no firm quantitative measures for 
adaptive capacity. It is, however, widely accepted that 
the underlying determinants of a high capacity to adapt 
(and to mitigate, for that matter) include routine access 
to resources, strong social and human capital, and 
routine access to risk-spreading mechanisms. The rural 
poor are lacking in most of these factors; thus, they are 
highly vulnerable under climate change. Moreover, 
climate impacts vary over space and time. As global 
adaptation funds accrue (as more members of the 
UNFCCC sign on to Kyoto and a successor agreement to 
Kyoto is developed), care must be taken to allow 
countries to follow their own approaches; but success 
across nations must be measured against consistent and 
as yet undefined standards. 
Some will read these recommendations with 
trepidation because very little climate change has 
occurred to date in many—but not all—places, so fears 
arise that large-scale adaptation programs may be 
premature or run the risk of being misdirected. It is also 
widely understood that the sources of low adaptive 
capacity are extraordinarily diverse. Will poor farmers in 
a particular location, for example, fail to adapt because 
of lack of knowledge, lack of resources, or poor 
government policies, and what would be the appropriate 
role of the international community in each case? The 
counterargument presented here is that these concerns 
do not constitute reasons not to act but rather are 
reasons to proceed cautiously in recognition that no 
single approach will work everywhere. The only way to 
learn what works, where, and why is to try, and—in the 
most difficult circumstances where action can actually 
begin to help the most vulnerable—now is the time to 
start trying in earnest. 
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